Program errors are hard to detect or prove absent. Allowing programmers to write formal and precise specifications, especially in the form of contracts, is a popular approach to program verification and error discovery. We formalize and implement a hybrid (static and dynamic) contract checker for a subset of OCaml. The key technique is symbolic simplification, which makes integrating static and dynamic contract checking easy and effective. Our technique statically checks contract satisfaction or blames the function violating the contract. When a contract satisfaction is undecidable, it leaves residual code for dynamic contract checking.
Introduction
Constructing reliable software is difficult. Formulating and checking (statically or dynamically) logical assertions [2, 5, 15, 17, 36] , especially in the form of contracts [7, 12, 13, 29, 40] , is one popular approach to error discovery. Static contract checking can catch all contract violations but may raise false alarms and can only check restricted properties; dynamic checking can check more expressive properties but consumes run-time cycles and only checks the paths actually executed, and so is not complete. Consider an OCaml program augmented with a contract declaration: (* val f1 : (int -> int) -> int *) contract f1 = ({x | x >= 0} -> {y | y >= 0}) -> {z | z >= 0} let f1 g = (g 1) -1 let f2 = f1 (fun x -> x -1)
The contract of f1 says that f1 will return a non-negative number whenever it is applied to a function that returns a non-negative number when given a non-negative number. Both a static checker and a dynamic checker are able to report that f1 fails its postcondition: a static checker relies on the unsoundness of ∀g : int → int, (g 1) ≥ 0 ⇒ (g 1) − 1 ≥ 0 while a dynamic checker evaluates (((fun x -> x -1) 1) -1) to -1, which violates the Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. PEPM'12, January [23] [24] 2012 , Philadelphia, PA, USA. Copyright c 2012 ACM 978-1-4503-1118-2/12/01. . . $10.00 contract {z | z >= 0}. However, a dynamic checker cannot tell that the argument (fun x -> x -1) fails f1's precondition because there is no witness at run-time, while a static checker can report this contract violation because ∀x : int, x ≥ 0 ⇒ x − 1 ≥ 0 does not hold. On the other hand, a static checker usually gives three outcomes: (a) definitely no bug; (b) definitely a bug; (c) possibly a bug. Here, a bug refers to a contract violation. As static and dynamic checking can be complementary, we may want to invoke a dynamic checker when the outcome is (c). This ensures that no contract violations can escape while maintaining expressiveness.
Following the formalization in [40] , but this time for a strict language, we first give a denotational semantics for contract satisfaction, i.e., we define what it means for an expression e to satisfy its contract t (written e ∈ t) without knowing how to check it. Next, we define a wrapper that takes e and t and produces a term e t with contract checks inserted at appropriate places in e. If a contract check is violated, a special constructor BAD l signals the violation where the label l precisely captures the function at fault. All we have to do is to check the reachability of BAD l in the term e t. We symbolically simplify the term e t, aiming to simplify BADs away. If some BAD constructors remain, we either report it as a compile-time error or leave the residual code for dynamic checking. We make the following contributions:
• We clarify the relationship between static contract checking and dynamic contract checking ( §2). A new observation is that, after static checking, we should prune away some more unreachable code before going to dynamic checking. Such unreachable code, however, is essential during static checking. We show the correctness of this pruning ( §6) with the telescoping property studied (but not used for such purpose) in [7, 40] . • We define e ∈ t and e t and prove a theorem "e t is crash-free ⇐⇒ e ∈ t" ( §4). "Crash-free" means BAD is not reachable under any context. Such a formalization is tricky and its correctness proof is non-trivial. We rework the proofs from [41] for a strict language.
• We design a novel SL machine that augments symbolic simplification with contextual information synthesis for checking the reachability of BAD statically ( §5). The checking is automatic and modular and we prove its soundness. Moreover, the SL machine produces residual code for dynamic checking.
• We design a logicization technique that transforms expressions to logical formulae. The key contribution is to deal with nontotal terms ( §5).
Overview
Assertions [17] state logical properties of an execution state at arbitrary points in a program; contracts specify agreements concerning the values that flow across a boundary between distinct parts of a program (modules, procedures, functions, classes). If an agreement is violated, contract checking is supposed to provide precise blaming of the function at fault. Contracts [29] and higher-order contracts [12] were to be checked at run-time when they were first introduced. To perform dynamic contract checking (DCC), a function must be called to be checked. For example:
contract inc = {x | x > 0} -> {y | y > 0} let inc = fun v -> v + 1 let h1 = inc 0
A dynamic checker wraps the inc in h1 with its contract t inc (a shorthand for the contract of inc):
where l is (2, 5, "inc") the (row,col) source location where inc is defined and l is (3, 10, "h1") the source location of the call site with caller's name. This wrapped h1 expands to:
In the upper box, the argument of inc is guarded by the check x > 0; in the lower box, the result of inc is guarded by the check y > 0. If a check succeeds, the original term is returned, otherwise, the special constructor BAD is reached and blame is raised. In this case, h1 calls inc with 0, which fails inc's precondition. Running the above wrapped code, we get BAD (3,10,"h1") , which blames h1. With the DCC algorithm, given a function f and a contract t, to check that the callee f and its caller agree on the contract t dynamically, a checker wraps each call to f with its contract:
t , which behaves the same as f except that (a) if f disobeys t, it blames f , signaled by BAD f ; (b) if the context uses f in a way not permitted by t, it blames the caller of f , signaled by BAD ? where "?" is filled with a caller name and the call site.
Later, [7, 40] give formal declarative semantics for contract satisfaction that not only allow us to prove the correctness of DCC against this semantics, but also to check contracts statically.
The essence of static contract checking (SCC) is:
into two halves: e t = e BAD f UNR ?
t and e t = e UNR f BAD ?
t.
The ("ensures") and the ("requires") are dual to each other. The special constructor UNR ("unreachable"), does not raise blame, but stops execution. (Those who are familiar with assert and assume can think of (if p then e else BAD) as (assert p; e) and (if p then e else UNR) as (assume p; e).) SCC is modular and is performed at the definition site of each function. For example, (λv.v + 1) t inc expands to:
At the definition site of a function, f = e, we assume f 's precondition and assert its postcondition. If all BADs in e t are not reachable, we know f satisfies its contract t. One way to check reachability of BAD is to symbolically simplify the fragment. In the above case, inlining x gives:
In this paper, besides symbolic simplification, we collect contextual information in logical formula form and consult an SMT solver to check the reachability of BAD. An SMT solver usually deals with formulae in first-order logic (FOL). In this section, we present formulae in higher-order logic while §5 gives the details of the generation of formulae in FOL. For the two subexpressions of the RHS of y, we have:
One can think of the existentially quantified x2 (and x3) as denoting the expression itself. For the RHS of y, we have:
We check the validity of a formula collected from the path to BAD (2,5,"inc") , i.e., ∀x1, Q1 ⇒ y > 0, by consulting an SMT solver. Since it is valid, we know that the BAD (2,5,"inc") is not reachable, thus inc satisfies its contract.
Consider the function f1 and its contract t f1 in §1. So f1 t f1 is (λg.(g 1) − 1) t f1 , which expands to:
After applying some conventional simplification rules, we have:
We see that the inner BAD (4,5,"f 1 ") has been simplified away, because x = x2 = 1 and (if 1 ≥ 0 then 1 else BAD (4,5,"f 1 ") ) is simplified to 1. As we cannot prove ∀x1, ∀z, (∃y, y = x1 1 ∧ (y ≥ 0 ⇒ z = y − 1)) ⇒ z ≥ 0, the other BAD (4,5,"f 1 ") remains. We can either report this potential contract violation at compile-time or leave this residual code R1 for DCC to achieve hybrid checking.
Hybrid contract checking (HCC) performs SCC first and runs the residual code as in DCC. In SCC, f1 t f1 checks whether f1 satisfies its postcondition by assuming its precondition holds. At each call site of f1, we wrap the function with . For example:
where zut is a difficult function for an SMT solver and zut's contract is {x | true}. Suppose zut {x | true} = zut, we then have the term f3 t f3 to be:
which requires f3 to satisfy f1's precondition and assumes f1 satisfies its postcondition because f1 t f1 has been checked. During SCC, a top-level function is never inlined. We do not have to know its detailed implementation at its call site as it has been guarded by its contract with f t. The f3 t f3 expands to:
As is dual to , the RHS of v is actually a copy of the earlier f1 t f1 but swapping the BAD and UNR and substituting x1 with zut. We now know the source location of the call site of f1 and its caller's name, the UNR ? becomes BAD (7, 10 ,"f 3 ") and the BAD (4,5,"f 1 ") becomes UNR (7, 10 ,"f 1 ") . At definition site where the caller is unknown, we use the location of f1, i.e., (4, 5, "f1"). Once its caller is known, we use (7, 10, "f1"). It is easy to get source location so we do not elaborate it further.
As an SMT solver says valid for ∀v.(∃z.z ≥ 0 ∧ v = z) ⇒ v ≥ 0, the f3 t f3 can be simplified to (say R2):
leaving one BAD. We can either report this potential contract violation at compile-time or continue a DCC. For SCC, we have checked f1 t f1 , but for DCC, to invoke f1 t f1 , we must use the residual code R1. However, the UNR clauses are useful for SCC, but redundant for DCC. We can remove UNRs with a simplification rule:
(We shall explain why it is valid to apply this rule even if e0 may diverge or crash in §6. Intuitively, UNR is indeed unreachable and e0 has been checked before this program point.) Applying the rule [rmUNR] to R1 and R2 and, simplifying a bit, we get:
respectively, which is the residual code being run. We show in §6 that HCC blames a function fi iff DCC blames fi.
Summary Given a definition f = e and a contract t, to check that e satisfies t (written e ∈ t), we perform these steps. 
The language
The language presented in this paper, named M, is pure and strict, and is a subset of OCaml with parametric polymorphism. Figure 1 gives the syntax of language M. A program contains a set of data type declarations, contract declarations and function definitions. Expressions include integers n, variables, lambda abstractions, applications, constructors and match expressions. We have top-level let rec, but for the ease of presentation, we omit local let rec. (It is possible to allow local let rec by either assuming that a local recursive function is given a contract or using contract inference [21] to infer its contract. Even if [21] is not modular, it is enough to infer a contract for a local function.) Pairs are a special case of constructed terms. A local let expression let x = e1 in e2 is syntactic sugar for (λx.e2) e1. An if expression if e0 then e1 else e2 is syntactic sugar for match e0 with {true → e1; false → e2}. We assume all top-level functions are given a contract. Contract checking is done after the type checking phase in a compiler so we
Syntax
Trivial values Figure 1 . Syntax of the language M assume all expressions, contexts, and contracts are well-typed and use the type information (presented as a superscript, e.g., e τ or t τ ) whenever necessary. Type-checking material is in [39] .
The two contract exceptions (also called blames) BAD l and UNR l are adapted from [40] . They are for internal usage, and are not visible to programmers. The label l captures source location and function name, which are useful for error reporting as well as for the examination of the correctness of blaming. But we may omit the label l when it is not the focus of the discussion. It is possible for programmers to write:
let head xs = match xs with
where raise : ∀α. Exception → α. The Error has type Exception, which is a built-in data type for exceptions. As we do not have try-with in language M (leaving it as future work), a preprocessing step converts raise Error to BAD head . We have four forms of contracts. The p in a predicate contract {x | p} refers to a boolean expression in the same language M. Dependent function contracts allow us to describe dependency between input and output of a function. For example, x : {y | y > 0} → {z | z > x} says that, the input is greater than 0 and the output is greater than the input. We can use a shorthand {x | x > 0} → {z | z > x} by assuming x scopes over the RHS of →. The → is right associative. Similarly, dependent tuple contracts allow us to describe dependency between two components of a tuple. For example, (x : {y | y > 0}, {z | z > x}) has short hand ({x | x > 0}, {z | z > x}). Contract Any is a universal contract that any expression satisfies. We support higher-order contracts, e.g., k : ({x | x > 0} → {y | y > x}) → {z | k 5 > z} for a function let f g = g 2. 
Operational semantics
The semantics of our language is given by the reduction rules in Figure 2 . For a top-level function, we fetch its definition from the evaluation environment Δ, which maps a variable to its definition. We adapt some basic definitions from [40] . 
We use BAD to signal that something has gone wrong in a program, which can be a program failure or a contract violation.
Definition 2 (Crash).
A closed term e crashes iff e → * BAD.
Our framework only guarantees partial correctness. A diverging program does not crash. At compile-time, one decidable way to check the safety of a program is to see whether the program is syntactically safe. 
Definition 3 (Diverges

Definition 4 (Syntactic safety). A (possibly open) expression
Definition 5 (Crash-free Expression). A (possibly open) expression e is crash-free iff : ∀C, BAD / ∈s C and (C[[e]]) bool ⇒ C[[e]] → * BAD
The quantified context C serves the usual role of a probe that tries to provoke e into crashing. A crash-free expression may not be syntactically safe, e.g., λx.if x * x ≥ 0 then x + 1 else BAD.
Lemma 1 (Syntactically safe expression is crash-free).
e is syntactically safe ⇒ e is crash-free For ease of presentation, when we do not give label l to BAD or UNR, we mean BAD or UNR for any l. Moreover, expressions BAD l and UNR l are closed expressions even if l is not explicitly bound.
Contracts
Inspired by [40] , we design a contract satisfaction and checking algorithm for a strict language. As diverging contracts make dynamic contract checking unsound (explained in §4.2) and we do hybrid checking, we focus on total contracts. Our definition of total contract is different from that in [7] , but close to the crash-free contract in [40] with an additional condition that λx.p is a terminating function. For example, contract {x | x = []} → {y | head x > y} is total in our framework because head x does not crash for all x satisfying {x | x = []}. Such a contract is not total in [7] because a crashing function head is called in a predicate contract.
A semantics for contract satisfaction
We give the semantics of contracts by defining "e satisfies t" (e ∈ t) in Figure 3 . Here are some consequences: (1) a divergent expression satisfies any contract, hence all contracts are inhabited; (2) only crash-free expressions satisfy a predicate contract; (3) any expression satisfies contract Any; (4) BAD only satisfies contract Any.
One difference from [40] is that, we do not allow p[e/x] in [A1] to diverge while [40] allows because they only do static checking. We support dependent tuple contracts, that are not in [7, 40] . One difference from [7] is that, they say that a crashing expression does not satisfy any contract; we say that a crashing expression satisfies the universal contract Any. Having a top ordering contract Any is debated in [11] . We define a subcontract ordering as follows.
Definition 7 (Subcontract). For all closed contracts t1 and t2, t1
is a subcontract of t2, written t1 t2, iff ∀e, e ∈ t1 ⇒ e ∈ t2
For example, we have {x | true} Any, but not vice versa. The Any is like (but not the same as) ∀α, α. Consider: contract fail = Any let fail = raise Error
In [7] and other refinement type checking framework [5, 24, 36] , they give function like fail a function contract {x | false} → {x | true} so that the precondition {x | false} allows their system to blame all the callers of fail. Using a function contract for a non-function type is somewhat ad hoc. More discussion on the contract Any can be found in [39] .
The wrappers
As mentioned in §2, the essence of contract checking is the two wrappers and , which are dual to each other, whose full versions are Figure 4 ) expands to a particular expression, which behaves the same as e except that it raises blame r1 if e does not obey t and raises r2 if the wrapped term is used in a way that violates t.
From 
The superscript τ says both e and t are well-typed and have the same type τ . Note that if t is terminating and e t is crash-free, then t is total. See [39] for a full proof and a completeness theorem. Basically, we rework the proofs in [41] for a strict language.
Unlike [12] , which assumes there are no exceptions in contracts, our checking algorithm detects contract exceptions in contracts. a contract violation occurs in {z | k 0 > -1} because the call k 0 fails k's precondition {x | x > 0}. The ri says that the label of ri is updated: r1's label is the call site of x1 in t2 and the name of the contract; r2's label is the location of "x1 :" and the name of x1. We leave the correctness proof of this label update as future work. Our proof [39] is different from that in [7] and the proof in [7] works because they use an ad hoc fix, i.e., using UNR instead of r1. then x1 else BAD) ), which diverges whenever applied because of the loop. However, the function fb is not crash-free.
The term t2[(x1
Terminating contracts
We only have to prove termination of functions used in contracts, not all the functions in a program. We can adapt ideas in [4, 27, 35] to build an efficient automatic termination checker.
Static contract checking and residualization
The Theorem 1 in §4.2 says that, to check contract satisfaction, we can check the reachability of BAD in e t as each BAD signals a contract violation. We introduce an SL machine ( Figure 5 ) which tries to simplify away the BADs in an expression. The novelty of our work is to combine symbolic simplification and contextual information (ctx-info) synthesis with logical store in order to achieve verification, blaming and residualization in one-go. The SL machine takes an expression e and produces its semantically equivalent and simplified version. A
4-tuple H | | e | | S | | L is to simplify e and a 4-tuple H | | e | | S | | L is to rebuild e where
• H is an environment mapping variables to trivial values;
• e is the expression under simplification (or being rebuilt);
• S is a stack which embodies the simplification context, or continuation that will consume a simplified expression; • L is a logical store which contains the ctx-info in logical formula form; its syntax is
where φ is a predicate in Figure 6 .
The job of the SL machine is to simplify an expression as much as possible, consulting the logical store when necessary; when it cannot simplify the expression further, it rebuilds the expression.
The SL machine
In Figure 5 , the constant n and blame r cannot be simplified further, thus being rebuilt as shown in [S-const] and [S-exn] respectively. One might ask why we rebuild rather than return a blame. There are two reasons: (a) it gives more information for static error reporting, i.e., we know conditions leading to a reachable BAD; (b) as we do hybrid contract checking, we want to send the residual code with undischarged blames to a dynamic checker.
As we perform symbolic simplification rather than evaluation (as for the CEK machine [14] 
), we only put a variable in the environment H if it denotes a trivial value. A variable denoting a top-level function is not put in H. Variables in H are inlined by [S-var1] while variables not in H are rebuilt by [S-var2].
Each element on the stack is called a stack frame where the hole • in a stack frame refers to the expression under simplification or being rebuilt. We use a to represent an expression that has been simplified. The syntax of S is 
The [S-lam] puts ∀x : int in L, which is initially empty:
The [S-match] starts to simplify the scrutinee x > 0, which is being rebuilt after a few trivial steps. 
In the true branch, after a few steps, we rebuild the scrutinee x + 1 > 0. In this case, ∀x : int, x > 0 ⇒ x + 1 > 0 is valid. By [R-s-match], we take the true branch, which is a constant 5. As both 5 and UNR cannot be simplified further, we rebuild them by [S-const] and [S-unr] respectively and obtain: 
Logicization
We now explain the conversion [[.]] f , which we call logicization. Figure 6 gives the abstract syntax of the logical formula supported by an SMT solver named Alt-ergo [8] , which is an automatic theorem prover for polymorphic first-order logic modulo theories. It uses classical logic and assumes all types are inhabited. First, Alt-ergo allows us to represent data type declaration, e.g.,
type 'a list = Nil | Cons of 'a * ('a list)
in Alt-ergo code with type and logic declarations:
Data type declaration in language M: Figure 7 . Converting data type to Alt-ergo code As Alt-ergo supports only first-order logic (FOL), the arguments of a logical function (e.g., cons) are given as a tuple. The type variable 'a is assumed universally quantified at top-level. The conversion algorithm for an arbitrary user-defined data type is in Figure 7 . A conventional way [22] to encode higher-order function to FOL is to define a type arrow and a logical function apply:
where the 'a and 'b refer to a function's input and output type respectively. Converting types in the language M is easy (Figure 8 ). Base types int and bool are data types with no parameter.
We now give an example to show what logicization can do. The function len computes the length of a list and the function append appends two lists. Let ea and ta stand for the definition and contract of append respectively. Applying only simplification rules (including reduction rules) to ea ta, we get (R3):
The simplification approach in [38] and the model-checking approach in [33] involve inlining top-level functions, while we do not. Instead, we axiomatize the top-level function definitions that were called in contracts and lift expressions under checking to logic level and consult an SMT solver. The challenge is to deal with non-total expressions (e.g., BAD) in our source code. In the literature about converting functional code (in an interactive theorem prover) to SMT formulae [1, 6, 9, 28] , expressions are converted to a logical form directly. In [1] , given a non-recursive function definition f = e, they first η-expand e to get f = λx1 . . . xn.e where e does not contain λ; if it is a recursive function, they as-sume e is in a particular form such that all lambdas are at top-level and the function performs an immediate case-analysis over one of its arguments. Then, they form ∀ − → x , f(x1 Figure 9 ). The subscript f in [[e] ] f denotes the expression e. Moreover, we perform neither η-expansion (which does not preserve semantics in the presence of non-total terms) nor λ-lifting, and yet we allow arbitrary forms of recursive functions. We have such flexibility because we convert λ-abstraction and partial application directly with the help of apply.
(Note that our logicization [[.] ] f can also produce higher-order logic formula for interactive proving by replacing (apply(f, x)) with (f (x)) and not converting the types.) No logicization work in the literature (including [6, 9, 28, 34] ) deal with non-total terms. The work [6] uses approaches in [9, 28] to deal with polymorphism while Alt-ergo itself supports polymorphism.
Our framework can systematically generate Alt-ergo code, like below, to show that those BADs in R3 are unreachable. and apply(len,cons(x, y)) = apply(len,v1) + apply(len,v2))
To make an SMT solver's life easier (i.e., multiple small axioms are better than one big axiom), we have two axioms for len, one for each branch, which are self-explanatory. As a constructor is always fully applied, we do not encode its application with apply. The -> (in axioms and goals) is a logical implication. For example, the axiom len_def_1, is generated by: Letting x0 be s, we get a more readable version (axiom len_def_1). An algorithm that partially eliminates redundant existentially quantified variables can be found in [39] .
Theorem 5 (Logicization for axioms). Given closed definition
f = e τ , the logical fomula ∃f : τ, [[e]] f is valid. ⊕ ∈ [+, −, * , /] ∈ [>, <, =] [[.]] f : Expression → Formula [[let (rec) f = e]] f = [ [e]] f top-level defn [[BAD l ]] f = true for axioms false for goals [[UNR l ]] f = false [[x]] f = f = x [[n]] f = f = n [[e τ 1 1 ⊕ e τ 2 2 ]] f = ∃x1 : [[τ1]], ∃x2 : [[τ2]], [[e1]]x 1 ∧ [[e2]]x 2 ∧ f = x1 ⊕ x2 [[e τ 1 1 e τ 2 2 ]] f = ∃x1 : [[τ1]], [[e1]]x 1 ∧ ∃x2 : [[τ2]], [[e2]]x 2 ∧ ((x1 t x2 ∧ f = true)∨ (not(x1 t x2) ∧ f = false)) [[λx τ .e]] f = ∀x : [[τ ]], [[e]] (apply(f,x)) [[let x τ = e1 in e2]] f = ∃x : [[τ ]], [[e1]]x ∧ [[e2]] f [[e τ 1 1 e τ 2 2 ]] f = ∃x1 : [[τ1]], [[e1]]x 1 ∧ ∃x2 : [[τ2]], [[e2]]x 2 ∧ f = apply(x1, x2) [[K e τ 1 1 . . . e τn n ]] f = ∃x1 : [[τ1]], [[e1]]x 1 ∧ · · · ∧ ∃xn : [[τn]], [[en]]x n ∧ f = K (y1, . . . , yn) [[ match e τ 0 0 with −−−−−−→ K − → x τ → e ]] f = ∃x0 : [[τ0]], [[e0]]x 0 ∧ ( −−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ ∀ − −− → x : [[τ ]], (x0 = K − → x ) ⇒ [[e]] f )
Figure 9. Convert expression to logical formula
Next, what query (i.e., goal) shall we make? All we want is to check if the branch leading to BAD is reachable or not. So our task is to examine the scrutinee of a match expression. For example, the goal app_1 states that the ctx-info v1=nil, which is from the pattern matching match v1 with More details on design choices are in [39] . Here, we highlight a few. (1) Only functions called in contracts are converted to Altergo axioms. (2) In Figure 9 , there are two conversions for BAD, true for axioms. This is for generating a harmless axiom true for the crashing branch of a partial function called in contracts. 
Discussion and preliminary experiments
One might notice that SL machine simplifies terms under lambda and the body of match expression while we do not have such execution rules in Figure 2 . As we rebuild blames and do not inline recursive functions (i.e., no crashing and no looping during simplification), the SL machine does not violate call-by-value execution.
One might worry that the rule [S-m-match] causes exponential code explosion for static analysis (although no run-time overhead). From our current observation, quite often the scrutinee is if b then d else e where e is BAD or UNR. As blames trigger the SL machine to immediately rebuild the blame with the rest of the stack, applying the rule [S-m-match], we do not have duplication but have a desired smaller formula for the SMT solver. We have implemented a prototype based on the source code of ocamlc-3.12.1. Table 1 shows the results of preliminary experiments, which are done on a PC running Ubuntu Linux with a quad-core 2.93GHz CPU and 3.2GB memory. We take some examples from [26] and OCaml stdlib and time the static checking. The column Ann gives the LOC count for contract annotations. One advantage of the SL machine is that it allows rules to be easily added or removed. This paper focuses on the theory of hybrid contract checking. We leave optimization and rigorous experimentation on tuning the strength of symbolic simplification and the frequency of calling an SMT solver as future work.
Related work
Contract semantics were first formalized for a strict language [7, 11] and later for a lazy language [40] . This paper adapts and reformalizes some of their ideas on contract satisfaction and contract checking. Detailed design difference is explained in §4. Pre/post-condition specification using logical formulae [2, 15, 17, 34] allows programmers to existentially quantify over infinite domains or express metaproperties that are not expressible in contracts. We like the idea of ghost refinement [36] , which separates properties that can be converted to program code from the metaproperties expressed only as logical formulae. As there are always limits to automatic static checking, it is practical to convert some difficult checks to dynamic checks. Unlike pre/post-condition specification, refinement types and contracts allow us to study subcontract relations [11, 41] , recursive contracts [7] , and polymorphic contracts [3] . Contracts also enjoy interesting mathematical properties [7, 11, 39, 40] .
One might recall hybrid refinement type checking (HTC) [13, 24] . In theory [16] , (picky, i.e. our) contract checking is able to give more blame than refinement type checking in the presence of higher-order dependent function contracts. That is partly why [36] invents a Kind checker to report ill-formed refinement types. As discussed in §4.2, we check e t for crash-freeness in one-go and do not have to check t to be crash-free separately. In practice, the H and L in the SL machine serve a similar purpose as the typing environment in HTC. But symbolic simplification gives more flexibility in such ways as teasing out the path sensitivity analysis with the rule [S-m-match], etc. We hope this work opens a venue to compare HCC and HTC in practice. Notably, VeriFast [20] (for verifying C and Java code) suggests that symbolic execution is faster than the verification condition generation method [2, 15] .
Khoo et al. [23] mix type checking and symbolic execution. Besides they do not generate residual code, they require programmers to place block annotations {t t} for type checking and {s s} for symbolic execution while our SL machine systematically simplifies subterms and consults the logical store for checking at the appropriate program point. Moreover, their symbolic expression is given in linear arithmetic, which is more restrictive than ours.
Our approach is different from [36] , which extracts proofs of refinement types from an SMT solver and injects them as terms in the generated bytecode RDCIL (like proof carrying code) during refinement type checking. Theirs has a security motivation.
Some work [25, 26, 32, 33] suggests converting programs to a higher-order recursive scheme (HORS), which generates (possibly infinite) trees, and specify properties in the form of a trivial automaton and do model checking to see whether HORS satisfies its desired property. Our approach is completely different although we both do reachability checking. They work on automata while we work on programs directly. Our approach is modular while theirs is not. They deal with local let rec while we do not, but we could infer local contract with method in [21] or inline the local let rec function for a fixed number of times. They deal with protocol checking while we do not, except where a protocol checking problem can be converted to checking the reachability of BAD.
The contextual information synthesis and conversion of expression to logical formula is inspired by the use of the application • in [18, 19] , which makes conversion of higher-order functions easier. But we use the technique in different contexts.
Many papers on program verification [2, 10, 15, 30, 31, 37] focus on memory leaks, array bound checks, etc. and a few handle higher-order functions and recursive predicates. Our work focuses on more advanced properties and precise blaming of functions at fault. Contract checking in the imperative world is lead by [10] , which statically checks contract satisfaction at the bytecode CIL level and runs dynamic checking separately. Residualization has not been done in [10] . We may adapt some ideas in [20] to extend our framework for program with side effects.
Conclusion
We have formalized a contract framework for a pure, strict, higherorder subset of OCaml. We propose a natural integration of static contract checking and dynamic contract checking. With the SL machine, our approach gives precise blame at both compile-time and run-time in the presence of higher-order functions. In the near future, besides rigorous experimentation and case-studies, we plan to add user-defined exceptions, allow side effects in program and hidden side effects in contracts, do contract or invariant inference.
